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A B STR A C T
Natural resource management in Southern Africa has predominantly been guided by the concerns with 
conservation of natural resources. This has seen the use of natural resources to sustain livelihoods taken 
as a subservient objective incidental to the pursuit of conservation efforts. The legislation has also been 
framed in the resource conservation framework thereby giving limited room for communities to diversify their 
livelihoods through the exploitation of natural resources. Legal authority over natural resources has never 
been fully “devolved” to the communities but has remained with governments and affiliated bodies like rural 
district councils. Community Based Natural Resources Management activities are not legislated but are 
dealt with through policy directives and statements that are not binding at law. Without the requisite legal 
status the communities are affected negatively by the changes or reversals of the directives. The role of 
natural resources in diversifying the rural livelihood portfolio continues to be downplayed and communities 
continue to have no legal custody of resources found amongst them.
(Keywords: natural resources, CBNRM, statutory framework, Botswana, Zimbabwe)
Abbreviations: CAMPFIRE - Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources; CBNRM 
- Community Based Natural Resource Management; NRM - Natural Resource Management; RDCs - Rural 
District Councils; SADC - Southern African Development Community; W M A-Wildlife Management Areas; 
VIDCOS - Village Development Committees; WINDFALL - Wildlife Industries New Development for All.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The debate on natural resource management has evolved overtime in a fashion which has seen a move from 
an “organic” community management of natural resources in the pre-colonial era through the state imposed 
regulatory framework in the colonial era. Presently, the calls for sustainable resource utilization have been 
growing. The concern with natural resource management and proper utilization has always been there but 
could be differentiated by the spirit and purpose behind it, as well as the undergirding factors for such 
concern.
From a mere concern with “proper” natural resource utilization and preservation/conservation there has 
been a shift in focus which has seen the embracing of broader economic goals in the management of 
natural resources. This feeds into the current vogue of sustainable resource utilization. Under the sustainable 
development paradigm, resource utilization should involve stakeholder participation and striking a balance 
between resource conservation and sustainable livelihoods. Sustainable livelihoods itself is not a clear-cut 
issue but is taken to mean livelihoods that can recover from stress and shocks and do not compromise the 
livelihood sources for future generations (Chambers, 1998; Hussein and Nelson, 1998; Scoones, 1998).
This paper argues that Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) should be seen as a 
way of diversifying the rural livelihoods and that this should be integral to the legislative and policy framework 
in natural resources management. It highlights that whilst the CBNRM projects have contributed to incomes 
of communities, these incomes are not secure and are affected by the lack of legal status on the part of 
communities. The comparative analysis is aimed at drawing general conclusions about CBNRM in Southern 
Africa. The paper is based on desk research, which entailed the analysis of the legislation and the policy 
framework for natural resource management in Zimbabwe and Botswana.
The first section of the paper discusses the evolution of CBNRM and highlights the fundamental requirements 
for the success of such initiatives. It highlights the secondary importance attached to the use of natural 
resources to enhance livelihoods as emphasis is placed on the conservation of natural resources. The 
second section focuses on the legislation in the two case study countries, i.e. Zimbabwe and Botswana, 
highlighting the key pieces of legislation that guide natural resources management. The paper discusses 
how the legislation, coupled with the policy directives, affects the CBNRM projects, especially in relation to 
use of the resources to generate economic gains for the communities. The third section gives a comparative 
analysis of the legislation in the case study countries to help in drawing conclusions on the CBNRM 
movement in Southern Africa. The paper concludes by highlighting some issues that need to be addressed 
if natural resources are to become a diverse source of income that will enhance rural livelihoods.
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2.0 EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
REGIMES
The evolution of natural resource management can be classified into three epochs - the pre- colonial, the 
colonial and the post independence. In the pre-colonial period there was community resource management 
through a whole array of sanctions and use patterns. Taboos and other declarations by the traditional 
leadership held sway. One could characterize this as what Katerere (1999) calls the “organic model” of 
natural resource management characterized by the maximization of community resource ownership.
The colonial period brought with it the usurping of the powers of traditional leadership and systems of 
resource management. A new interpretation of resource use was put in place because of the perceived 
threat posed to the environment in the marginal, ecologically fragile communal areas. The preservation of 
natural resources became a topical issue. A host of segregatory legislation was put in place. In Zimbabwe, 
until 1975 all natural resources belonged to the state. As in most Southern African countries, the legislation 
in natural resources management (NRM) was scattered and fragmented but was similar in its oppressive 
nature. As pointed out by Environment in Southern Africa (1994), the occasional hunter was overnight 
turned into a “poacher” . Emphasis was on the preservation of natural resources; no wonder why the 
regulations were seen as oppressive by the black majority population, and hence the violation at any 
possible opportunity.
The post-colonial governments brought some changes to the legislation. There was a wholesale change to 
the race discriminatory sections of the legislation but very little was done to refocus the contents of the 
principal legislation guiding natural resource use. Very little was done by way of devolving the ownership of 
natural resources to the local level. Traditional leadership was not revamped as in the pre-colonial system. 
As Rihoy et al. (1999) put it, the traditional leadership was viewed as having worked in cahoots with the 
colonial regimes. It was therefore not surprising that the traditional leadership was stripped of powers and 
there was the creation of parallel modern institutions such as village development committees (VIDCOs) in 
Zimbabwe for development purposes. Although it might have not been explicit, the traditional leadership 
was stripped of powers to regulate resources including land as these were to be handled by the new modern 
institutions put in place by the government.
Resource ownership was still vested with the state either in the form of central government or its affiliated 
institutions or arms-such as Rural District Councils (RDCs). There was a general trend towards the 
centralization of control over resources. However, in the mid-1980s there was a gradual shift in most SADC 
countries towards CBNRM regimes. As pointed out by several authors (Murphree, 1990,1993; Thomas, 
1992; Bond, 1999) the rationale for CBNRM was derived from the following:
• A growing realization of the state’s inability to control natural resource management i.e. lack of 
capacity to enforce regulations.
• Breakdown of traditional management systems due to the colonial and post-colonial resource 
legislation based on enforcement.
• Global appreciation that devolved natural resource management is a necessary and appropriate 
approach for sustainable natural resource management.
CBNRM has evolved as the key natural resource management regime in Southern Africa as evidenced by 
the array of CBNRM projects in Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. Regional 
initiatives such as the SADC Natural Resource Management programme are also evidence of the various 
attempts at changing approaches to NRM. It is then essential to look at CBNRM in detail, especially the 
economic empowerment element.
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3.0 COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Development theory debates and approaches have evolved to the stage of sustainable development. 
Sustainable development like so many other words in the development lexicon has often been alluded to 
but it remains an enigma to many. Sustainable development entails the use of resources today without 
undermining the capacity of future generations to do the same. This was put across as:
“A process of change in which the exploitation of resources and direction of investment, the mention 
of technological development, and institutional changes are all in harmony to enhance both current 
and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations” (The World Commission on Environment 
and Development, 1987:xx).
CBNRM is born out of the sustainable development paradigm and hinges on sustainable natural resource 
utilization and management. As highlighted earlier, the guiding principles in NRM have largely been based 
on the preservationist ethic. This created a lot of conflict as the regulatory framework was imposed and 
viewed with animosity by the villagers. This raised the question of who is important, the elephant or the 
human being?
CBNRM marks a new thrust in development initiatives. It has been argued that NRM should be seen in the 
broad sense of development. AsZaal etal. (1998) put it, NRM projects should ensure that current production 
is of primary importance and there is need to strike a balance between resource use and conservation.
There is the fundamental problem of defining a community. What is a “community" as alluded to by the 
CBNRM projects and can a universal agreement be found regarding what constitutes the community? How 
representative is the community? CBNRM can take place at different spatial levels such as the district and 
ward levels. The community as referred to in this paper is limited to the lower spatial level, which is the ward 
level. This community then becomes the population resident within this spatial zone. The delimitation of 
communities poses problems and as such communities have to be defined differently depending on the 
matter in context. The ward level represents a reasonable spatial unit within which natural resource 
management can be undertaken and in the case of Zimbabwe it is the spatial unit which has been adopted 
by CBNRM initiatives.
The new thrust has been to try to link development economics or economic opportunism with NRM. This 
linkage takes place under the ambit of the sustainable development paradigm, which advocates community 
participation and empowerment in development initiatives. Barbier (undated) says that sustainable economic 
development hinges on striking an optimal balance or interaction between the three systems below through 
a dynamic process of trade offs:
• Biological resource system;
• Economic system; and
• Social system.
The biological system looks at protection of the natural resource to ensure that it is not over-exploited. The 
economic and social systems look at natural resources and gains to communities living among them.
The concern with conservation or preservation of natural resources has come from different quotas of society. 
The conservation of resources has been largely guided by the need to preserve natural resources. This 
phenomenon is associated with the western sentimentalization of endangered species. The group is what 
Murphree (1993) referred to as the “wildlife lobby”. This group includes the western romantics, sentimental 
conservationists, and safari and tour operators. This group largely believes that wildlife provides the best, 
ecologically and economically (at least to tour and safari operators) an efficient and rational form of land 
usage. Under this arrangement, that there might be some benefits filtering to communities has largely 
been incidental to the preservation of resources. However, the accrual of economic benefits to communities 
from NRM ought to be an integral component rather than being a by-product of the process. This is likely to 
give a greater impetus for care in the way people look after and use natural resources. CBNRM has to be
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viewed as a way of enhancing “rural livelihoods” through the diversification of income. As a “non farm” 
activity this has to be seen as a livelihood diversification vehicle. As in a balanced business portfolio, a 
“balanced livelihood portfolio” is one with diversified income sources (Chambers, 1998; Hussein, 1998; 
Pretty, 1998). Natural resources, as part of the physical capital stock, could be and should indeed be 
utilized as a springboard for economic development by providing additional income no matter how meagre. 
To see the significance of additional income one can juxtapose the income from CBNRM related activities 
to the overall household totals. The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE) has been seen as a way of building a resource for community projects such as the refurbishment 
of schools, and building of clinics. This has been accomplished in Mahenye and Tstholotsho in Zimbabwe. 
At an individual level the communities should also benefit from the resources. The key then is that natural 
resources can be tapped to enhance livelihoods. The diagram below (Figure 1) depicts the two polar 
motivations for NRM as highlighted earlier on.
Figure 1: Polar perspectives on natural resources management
Historically the economic benefit or developmental arm has been downplayed. The two arms have been 
treated as mutually exclusive. However, a balance has to be struck in the utilization of natural resources. 
As argued by Breton (2000), the development of an interdependence or symbiotic relationship between 
people and natural resources gives people reason to invest in the sustainable utilization and management 
of these resources. The resulting arrangement is the equal weighting of use and conservation and the two 
being viewed as mutually inclusive rather than the exclusiveness of objectives as depicted in the diagram 
above. Figure 2 below highlights the interaction of resource conservation and use.
Figure 2: Striking a balance between conservation and resource use
The intersection comes from the idea of a balancing act of the NRM polar perspectives. The characterization 
above highlights that there is still need to look at how best communities can protect their natural resources 
in order not to deprive the future generations of these resources. There has to be concern with strict 
resource conservation in the conservationist framework. Natural resources have to be used in a sustainable 
manner in line with the general sustainable development arguments. However, on the other hand issues of 
survival are also raised. Thinking of saving the black rhino on an empty stomach might not hold way. 
Present consumption becomes vital.
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Striking a balance is then key to what one could term sustainable, economically edifying resource utilization. 
This term implies the need to take due cognizance of the need to use resources in a sustainable way whilst 
at the same time recognizing the need to take into account the usufruct requirements of the present 
generation. The key consideration in the legislative framework is to create the space, which makes it 
possible to exploit the resources for economic benefits at both the community and individual levels. Scope 
might be there presently but is limited. That consumption and exploitation is taking place does not signify 
acceptance on the part of existing legislation. The bigger the intersection (Figure 2) the greater the goal 
congruency and common understanding. What this means is that if communities want to enjoy greater use 
of resources they should put much more effort in the conservation efforts to make this possible. The idea is 
not to have an inverse relationship between use and conservation wherein more emphasis in one will result 
in a negative impact on the other. There could be a “win-win” situation. The two should intersect and move 
in the same direction although not necessarily at the same magnitude.
4.0 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEW ORK AND COMMUNITY USE
As already highlighted the pre-colonial regulatory framework under traditional leadership allowed regulated 
use of natural resources. The colonial era resulted in most Southern African countries having a regulatory 
framework divided along racial lines. The legislation was generally anti-black and bestowed less rights on 
them compared to their white counterparts. The post independence legislation in most Southern African 
countries ( Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) was largely populist and based on socialist egalitarian 
goals. The immediate move was removing the racist elements in all pieces of legislation.
The birth of CBNRM was enveloped in the idea of giving the communities the requisite use rights. One of the 
critical success factors for CBNRM is the legal status of the community. The question is whether communities 
do have the control over resources and whether they are legal entities. Bromley (1995:39) argued for property 
rights and points out that a right “denotes a set of actions and behaviour that the owner may not be 
prevented from undertaking. A right by definition implies an obligation on the part of all others to respect 
certain actions and behaviours, and to refrain from preventing those actions or behaviours”. Rights therefore 
have an element of duties, responsibilities as well as benefits. Since rights can be enforced at law then 
communities would benefit from having clear rights over resources in CBNRM. Questions have been asked 
about the devolution of ownership of resources. As will be highlighted below, in general, ownership and 
legal control over land and other resources vests with the state or its affiliated institutions.
The question, which also comes into one's mind, is whether the legislative framework empowers individuals 
within communities to be able to derive economic benefits out of the existing stock of resources. There is 
also need to revisit the question of personal use with regard to forestry produce. This calls for a revision of 
how one defines “personal use” which is, for example, permitted by the Zimbabwean legislation. Can the 
issue of personal use not be extended to the individuals utilizing resources for commercial use? Can 
individuals not be allowed to sell wild fruits for economic gain? If licences for commercial exploitation can be 
obtained from council what then inhibits the same leverage being given to the communities in question?
The next section looks at the case studies to see whether the key legislation permits the use of resources 
to derive economic benefits. As Rihoy (1995:17) points out, “A critical component of the decentralization or 
devolution process is to ensure that local institutions are effectively empowered on both a legal basis and 
through the provision of skills and resources that they need to function” . It is then imperative to see whether 
the legislation in the case study countries gives the community the requisite legal authority over the natural 
resources in their areas as this is deemed a critical success factor for CBNRM projects.
a) Zimbabwe
Prior to 1975 all natural resources belonged to the state. The 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act extended the 
ownership of natural resources to private property owners e.g. commercial farmers. They were given jurisdiction 
over natural resources in their areas. This enabled farmers to enjoy economic benefits through activities 
like game hunting. The black communities, however, also benefited to a limited extent in the late 1970s 
through The Wild Life Industries New Development For All (WINDFALL) programme. The understanding was
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that the conflict between wildlife and people would be reduced if the villagers received some benefits from 
wildlife management proceeds (Jansen, 1990). The revenues from safari hunting and elephant culling were 
given to the local district councils. The communities benefited through the District Development Fund (DDF) 
in the form of, for example, schools refurbishment. The programme was, however, limited in coverage and 
communities also saw the money as a grant from central government. This was because in the end there 
was no direct link between management of resources and the receipt of funds. This was, nevertheless, an 
improvement from the earlier system in which the people were not involved in the management of the 
resources (Child efa/.,1997).
The amended Parks and Wildlife Act (1982) extended the ownership of resources to RDCs in the spirit of 
decentralization of central government functions. This resulted in the extension of “appropriate authority” 
status to the RDCs. The reasoning or logic was that the RDCs are an embodiment of the interests of the 
people, and hence it was tantamount to placing resource management in the hands of the people. This is 
further reinforced by the RDCs Act of 1988; according to this Act, the RDCs are the government at the local 
level and therefore are entrusted with the regulation of natural resources management. They are empowered 
to make by-laws on conservation and environmental matters. This is reinforced by the Policy for Wildlife in 
Zimbabwe (1992) of which Section 1.15 points out that:
“The conservation committees of Rural District Councils will act as the first level of regulation and
coordination of issues related to wildlife in the rural districts of Zimbabwe in accordance with the
Minister’s delegation of appropriate authority. ”
The councils are, therefore, the custodians of the resources. However, this misses the point of empowerment 
of communities. Johnson and Mbizvo (1999) point out that the success of CBNRM depends on developing 
a legal framework, which allows producers to manage resources and benefits.
The CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe has largely been hailed as a way of trying to balance conservation 
and resource utilization. Although communities have realized some benefits, the communities do not have 
a say in the levels of resource utilization. In spite of the existence of CAMPFIRE committees, the communities 
are not directly responsible for the devolution of the proceeds of CAMPFIRE or the determination of the 
quotas i.e. the levels of resource use. The quotas are regulated by the RDCs, which have the regulatory 
authority. Without meaningful decision making by the communities through the CAMPFIRE committee, the 
following observation by Christoffersen etal. (1996) becomes relevant. They argued that without the meaningful 
involvement of the communities in the management decisions the programme activities become nothing 
more than tourist revenue schemes. The level of empowerment is, therefore, critical in deciding whether 
there is community management since the receipt of dividends by itself does not translate into empowerment 
of communities.
The CAMPFIRE programme has been limited in Zimbabwe mainly to mega fauna but natural resources 
extend beyond this. Forestry products are also a major class of resources and their management and use 
are guided mainly by the Forest Act of 1948 but amended in 1982 and the Communal Land Forestry 
Produce Act of 1987. These two pieces of legislation vest the ownership of resources with the RDCs, which 
are deemed the custodians of the resources. The Communal Land Forestry Produce Act allows the 
utilization of resources by communities albeit for personal use only. Section 4(i) of the Act points out that:
“The inhabitants of any communal land shall have the right within that communal land, to exploit for
their own use any forest produce”.
Interestingly, however, the same Section, through Section 4(ii), prohibits the sale of produce to third parties 
or outside the confines of the communal land in question. Exploitation for commercial use is only possible 
subject to the acquisition of a license, which can be obtained via the payment of a licence fee. This 
invariably excludes most of the rural population who would rather risk harvesting the resources, without a 
licence, for sale than pay for such a licence. The application for the permit under the Communal Land 
Forestry Produce Act itself is a rigorous and time-consuming process which most of the villagers would 
rather avoid and continue “poaching”. Expropriation is, therefore, limited to domestic utilization. The sale of
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the produce is not allowed at law. Consequently, individuals cannot sell the produce to derive economic 
benefits from these resources, e.g. wild fruit such as masau found in Mt. Darwin district. That people are 
doing it does not reflect consent but signifies the lack of appropriate enforcement mechanisms to restrict, 
the use of these resources. In the case o f minerals the permit system also applies and this when coupled 
with the local authorities by-laws complicates matters.
The various pieces of legislation allow for use, albeit limited. They limit the levels of usage and still emphasize 
the preservation leg of the relationship in a relationship one could characterize as follows (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Resource use that is subservient to conservation concerns
The utilization of the resources becomes incidental to the major objective of natural resource management 
outside restricted areas. The legislation is much more concerned with the preservation of natural resources 
such that the utilization of the resources to sustain livelihoods is really not a consideration and therefore a 
peripheral issue. This fails to link the CBNRM projects as a livelihood diversification vehicle. The funds 
generated from the efforts of the project should go towards diversifying the “fragile” and limited rural livelihood 
portfolios.
The legislation guiding natural resource use in Zimbabwe was formulated in the colonial era and was guided 
by conservation concerns. It might have changed names but the content has not changed. Although the 
legislation is restrictive and does not expressly promote commercial exploitation of natural resources by 
communities, resource use is tolerated. The government realizes that it does not have an enforcement 
mechanism to regulate the exploitation of the resources and therefore tends to turn a blind eye as trying to 
do otherwise would be an exercise in futility.
b) Botswana
Botswana has a slightly different colonial history from Zimbabwe and other Southern African countries; 
because of its deemed limited potential it was not under direct colonial rule but was administered as a 
British protectorate. This resulted in limited occupation with the percentage of land taken by the white 
commercial farmers not at any point exceeding 5.5% (Rihoy eta!., 1999). The colonial regime had very 
limited interest in the abundant wildlife. During this time the traditional leadership had control over the 
natural resources and they allowed tribesmen to exploit the resources subject to the restrictions that they 
themselves devised. In 1962 the Fauna Conservation Proclamation was passed to regulate safari hunting. 
This was limited to the whites and the big commercial farming areas. Under the 1979 Unified Hunting 
Regulations this was then extended to the tribal land with licences being issued and the revenue accruing 
to the District Councils. The effect was that those communities bearing the social costs of living with wild 
animals enjoyed less benefits than the outsider since the revenue was shared across the district. This 
centralization of revenue collection discouraged the communities.
As early as the 1980s the Botswana government realized and took the use of natural resources as an 
integral component of the development process. This was reflected in the national development policies.
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The Government Paper Number 1 of 1986 highlighted the value the government placed on natural resources. 
Article 6 of the policy highlighted the overall aim of the policy as:
“The policy not only recognizes but also emphasizes the need to obtain a better ‘yield’ or economic 
return from the land allocated for wildlife while at the same time ensuring continuity of the resource.... 
When the substantial flow of benefits of wildlife utilization on a sustained yield basis begin to be 
realized the resource’s value will be more widely appreciated. Conservation will enjoy even greater 
support”.
The government obviously realized and acknowledged the principle at the centre of the CBNRM movement, 
which is that the communities can only take a keen interest in natural resource management and conservation 
if they perceive there will be a benefit derived from their efforts. There has to be a positive correlation 
between the conservation efforts and the benefits emanating from these efforts. It was in light of the overall 
policy objective that the establishment of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) was emphasized. These 
were defined in terms of Article 3.1 of the aforementioned policy paper as rich game habitats outside the 
Parks and Wildlife areas. The WMAs were to be considered as a separate zoning in terms of land use 
planning.
Interesting to note, however, was the distinction made between the WMAs and the Parks and Wildlife 
areas. Article 3.4.1 highlighted the distinction:
“Wildlife Management areas will differ from National Parks and Game reserve areas in that Parks 
and Reserve areas are as previously stated primarily preservation areas; total preservation of the 
wildlife resource is practiced. In WMA, on the other hand, sustainable wildlife utilization will be 
actively encouraged”.
The point emphasized was that there was an element of sustainable usage planned. The WMAs then were 
a land use category within which the community could derive an economic benefit out of the natural resources 
found in their areas.
This linkage between the natural resources and the general development process has been reflected in the 
government policies over the years. The Government Policy Paper Number 1 of 1990 continued to highlight 
the need to diversify the rural economy through the use of wildlife resources to gain economic benefits. The 
policy paper stated the need to balance the developmental and conservation goals. The policy document 
advocated the development of multi rather than single purpose natural resource use. An interesting factor, 
which came out of the 1990 policy document paper, was the acknowledgement of the need to make trade 
offs between environmental concerns and resource use. Article 2.3 points out the following:
“Fulfillment of these detailed goals entails designing development so as to minimize environmental 
costs and to enhance the quality of the environment. It likewise requires that, when tradeoffs have to 
be made involving the use of natural resources, full account is taken of environmental and social as 
well as economic costs”.
The realization was that in trying to derive the economic benefits from the use of natural resources it means 
that resource utilization has to be intensified. Instead of having zero utilization as in the Parks and Wildlife 
areas there has to be sustainable community utilization of the resources. This goes with the arguments put 
in this paper earlier about the need to enlarge the intersection of the development objectives of resource use 
and the need to conserve the resources in light of the need for sustainable development. The enunciation of 
this in policy is a significant move in the right direction as it indicates some level of commitment by 
government and its inclusion in the national development plans is very crucial.
In the case of Botswana the legal status of communities is slightly different from the scenario in Zimbabwe. 
Policy directives such as the 1995 ‘SAVINGRAM’ and Joint Venture Guidelines supported the legal status 
of communities. They stipulated the minimum conditions for communities in the set up of WMAs and 
entering into joint ventures with the private sector. The communities could apply for a wildlife quota from the
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Department of Wildlife and National Parks. This was subject to the existence of recognized, accountable 
local management structures (Rihoy, 1999). Under the arrangement the committees could sub-lease the 
rights. The steps undertaken by the approved WMAs are as follows:
• Establish the legal status by publication of the boundaries in the government gazette.
• Develop and legislate appropriate WMA regulations.
• Draft a management plan for each area.
• Implement a policy of sustained wildlife utilization appropriate to each designated area.
In the WMAs the committees form Community Trusts, which are legal entities. Before committees can 
enter into contracts they have to form the trusts. The question is whether the community constitutes a legal 
entity that can enter into contractual arrangements. A community trust is a legal entity at law and can 
therefore sue and be sued.
There has, however, been a sad development in the area of CBNRM in Botswana. In February 2001 the 
Ministry of Local Government issued a directive stating that, “with immediate effect all revenues collected 
from CBNRM projects would have to be channeled to the district councils”. The arguments for the above U- 
turn in policy are that natural resources are a national asset and as such the benefit should be shared by 
the whole nation. The other reason advanced is that the community trusts were producing unaudited books 
and that there had been fraud and misuse of the funds. The above arguments defeat the whole essence of 
CBNRM that is underpinned by the argument that the communities are likely to be inclined to properly 
utilize resources when they perceive that there will be a direct benefit. The other argument is that there 
should be a proportionate relationship between the benefit and the costs. The cost of living with the wildlife, 
which is borne by the communities, has to be compensated. As such, commentators rightly point out that 
this is a retrogressive step being taken by the Botswana government. The community will see no benefit 
from the conservation efforts, and hence there is likely to be increased poaching of wildlife.
This centralization of revenue collection to the district councils runs counter to the decentralization process, 
which has characterized governance in the last decade. The government is seen trying to regulate all the 
revenue collection and the idea of averaging the revenue throughout the country negates the fundamental 
principle of proportionate benefits and costs in CBNRM. The current legislation means that the Botswana 
legislation on CBNRM has gone a full cycle and has now returned to the restrictive phase where management 
of natural resources did not benefit the community directly. It will be difficult to link the receipt of funds to 
their conservation efforts. When brought to a simple exposition, what the Botswana government is doing 
now is tantamount to retracing of steps in the CBNRM movement in that country.
6.0 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In general terms in both the case studies the custodial rights of the communities are limited. The rights rest 
with the rural district councils in the case of Zimbabwe and the Local Land Boards in the case of Botswana 
as well as the Department of Wildlife and National Parks. The communities are allowed some level of 
exploitation in both circumstances but they do not have control as to how much of the resource they can 
exploit. The RDC in the case of Zimbabwe defines how much the communities can get as a hunting quota 
and the district council determines the contracts, which are signed with outsiders. In Botswana the case is, 
however, slightly different in the sense that the communities are legal entities as trusts. This means that a 
community can then be able to enter into a binding contract with a third party and these contracts can then 
be enforced in a court of law. This also means that the community could regulate the activities of those who 
will be granted a licence.
The Zimbabwean scenario is such that the benefits are devolved in accordance with what the district council 
deems prudent. The district council maintains the accounts for the CBNRM initiatives. What this means is 
that the communities get a residual figure after the council has removed whatever portions it deems necessary. 
The CAMPFIRE guidelines on the devolution of revenue collection are not binding and the councils can 
ignore them. In the case of Botswana the devolution of the benefits, until the February 2001 directive alluded 
to earlier, used to rest with the community trust, which is a recognized entity at law. This gave the communities 
greater leverage in terms of how to utilize the resources.
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This is different from the Zimbabwean scenario where there is a CAMPFIRE committee, which has no legal 
status, and is therefore not a legal entity. The committees rely on the blessing of the RDC, which decides 
on the devolution of the benefits from natural resources management. The implications of the lack of 
appropriate legal status on the part of communities even those involved in CAMPFIRE is that they cannot 
enter into contracts, and hence have no legal standing. As Maveneke (1998) said, the communities couldn’t, 
for example, enter into legal contracts with safari operators in their respective areas. They also cannot sue 
and they cannot regulate the activities of those given licences. As Chenje et at. (1998) put it, people do not 
have legal standing to bring either the state or the other individuals to the courts for mismanaging resources 
orfor nomcompiiance with the provisions of environmental legislation.
As already pointed out, in the case of Botswana there is no legislated regulatory framework facilitating the 
CBNRM projects. This to some extent applies to the Zimbabwean scenario where there are only CAMPFIRE 
guidelines. The directive reversing the approach in Botswana could have a spillover effect to the other 
countries in the region. The Botswana case study had been looked at as the flagship of the southern Africa 
CBNRM projects because the legal component was better established than in any other country. What this 
unfortunate situation means is that it emphasizes the point alluded to earlier, that there is need for a very 
clear legislative framework which will give the communities the legal status which can be sustained over 
time. The use of policy directives to regulate CBNRM activities does not help the situation, as they do not 
have the force of law, and hence are not binding. As a result, the directives can be reversed overnight as in 
the Botswana case.
Interesting to note, however, is the fact that the government of Botswana will have difficulties in collecting 
the revenue where legal trusts were already in existence. This then means the new policy regulation will be 
unable to dispossess the already existing trusts but will only impact negatively on any future attempts at 
CBNRM projects. This is so because the existing trusts are legal entities with right at law, and hence 
cannot easily be arm-twisted. This is the kind of strength that the communities should have in order to fully 
empower them.
The different CBNRM programmes have, however, failed to empower communities to fully utilize the natural 
resources and gain better livelihoods. In the case study countries (Botswana and Zimbabwe) the communities 
have limited control. However, as noted earlier, community ownership of resources is key to the success of 
CBNRM. The quota or quantity of resources to be exploited is still determined outside the community, for 
example by RDCs or the Department of Wildlife and National Parks in the case of Botswana. The above 
use has also been limited to mega fauna and, to a limited extent, minerals.
There has also been reluctance to shift the management authority beyond the local level. This might derive 
from what Rihoy et at. (1999) call the reluctance of cash strapped district authorities to devolve tenure and 
valuable resources to individual villages. This has been evident in the Zimbabwean case and Botswana 
seems to be tagging along in this recentralisation approach. The trend indicates that the district councils 
are viewed as the last level of accountability, and hence the governments are not keen to devolve authority 
beyond that level. Communities are therefore not effectively represented in the decision making process 
and in the end become just passive recipients of dividends from tourism activities.
The devolution of the benefits of the CBNRM proceeds accrues to the communities through the Community 
Trusts in the case of Botswana and through the RDCs in the case of Zimbabwe. This makes it possible for 
the communities to implement developmental projects such as the upgrading of schools, roads, community 
centres and other social facilities. It is only in rare circumstances that the funds are devolved to individual 
communities. In as much as the communities’ benefit is appreciated, one is bound to agree with Gaborone 
(1998) who argued that the building of infrastructure is the responsibility o f the local authorities and that the 
individuals are, therefore, not empowered at all. Individuals cannot, therefore, under the current legislative 
framework exploit the natural resources for individual economic empowerment.
Botswana, until the February 2001 directive, represented one of the more successful examples of how to 
structure tenure regimes, which are compatible with general development objectives. The importance of 
natural resources at the highest level of government and incorporation into the national development policies 
is crucial in facilitating livelihoods enhancing CBNRM.
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7.0 CONCLUSION
Principal legislation in NRM enacted by the state still resonates an element of control and preservation. 
The legislation allows some element of resource utilization (e.g. in Zimbabwe, Communal Land Forestry 
Produce Act, Mineral and Mines Act, and Forestry Act) but it does not guarantee full benefits and does not 
highlight the contribution, which the natural resources can make towards economic benefits. Most Southern 
African countries have attempted to draw resources closerto the people and to make people derive economic 
benefits through CBNRM programmes such as CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe and WMA in Botswana. The 
enabling legislation has not gone the whole “nine yards” in enshrining community utilization of resources to 
sustain livelihoods. Rather, the issue of economic benefits is incidental to conservation and natural resource 
protection.
The legislation in SADC countries, and in the context of this study Zimbabwe and Botswana, shows that 
governments are still “uneasy and uncomfortable” with decentralizing the control of natural resources to 
communities. There is little recognition of how the natural resources can be a vehicle for diversifying the 
rural livelihood portfolios through the generation of economic benefits. There is very limited express 
appreciation of the role of natural resources. That de facto people in rural areas are deriving some economic 
benefits through the exploitation of natural resources is only by default as the central and local governments 
fail to enforce the regulations and by-laws.
In the present situation the major issues in CBNRM are determined by third parties such as the RDCs in 
Zimbabwe, the Land Boards or the departments of Parks and Wildlife in both countries. The devolution of 
the benefits rests with the RDC in the case of Zimbabwe. This creates problems, as it is a known fact that 
the RDCs are cash strapped and are, therefore, inclined to retain the money than release it to the communities. 
Communities need to be given a legal status, which enables them to have control over natural resources. 
The idea of community trusts is one way of getting round this problem. This enables the communities to be 
legal entities that can enforce contracts against third parties. Communities should be key in the decision 
making process with the RDCs at most just facilitating and kick-starting the process. The community has 
to be a legal entity, which will have the full powers to regulate their resources.
Natural resources have to be seen as an integral part of the development process. Natural resource use for 
development promotion should be key in the determination of natural resource management. There is need 
to accord immediate use of resources greater importance, as this is likely to give a greater impetus to the 
initiation of conservation measures. Natural resources should be seen as a livelihood enhancing resource to 
the extent that they enable the communities to generate incomes to diversify the livelihood portfolios. This 
should not be incidental to the conservation efforts but an integral component of the natural resource 
management regimes. Rural livelihoods are fragile and constrained by heavy reliance on subsistence agriculture 
and as such anything which helps in providing additional income is a welcome development. This should 
not only apply to areas with wildlife but to all areas with exploitable natural resources.
8. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
• There is need for the policy framework to acknowledge individual usage of natural resources to 
support livelihoods.
• In the case of Zimbabwe, there is need to give communities legal standing at law to enable them to 
have greater leverage in negotiations. In this light there is also need to review the relationship between 
communities and the RDCs. The devolution of CBNRM dividends has to be decided upon by 
communities in the true spirit of meaningful decentralization.
• There is need for both countries to shift from the use of policy directives to the enactment of enabling 
legislation. This will ensure that there are no policy U-turns as was the case with Botswana in 
February 2001. Policy directives have no effect at law and are difficult to take to the courts when 
violated.
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• Taking sustainable developments and livelihoods as the guiding framework there is need to look at
natural resources as a livelihood enhancing resource. This translates into the need to refocus the 
principal guiding legislation, from preservation of nature towards sustainable utilization of natural 
resources. There is need to strike a balance between present use of resources and future availability 
of the same resources.
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